9 PERCENT? 13 PERCENT? WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
By David Makovsky
Ha'aretz English Edition
Thursday, May 21, 1998
WHILE THE PUBLIC PUZZLES OVER THE PULLBACK NUMBERS GAME, A HEBREW UNIVERSITY SCHOLAR HAS IT ALL FIGURED OUT
Tourism Minister Moshe Katzav recently complained that the scope of the second redeployment from the territories has not been discussed in the inner cabinet, saying that maps are only unfurled in hushed sessions in the four-member "kitchenette" led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Science Minister Michael Eitan claims there has been no discussion of the issue in the weekly cabinet meetings.
Into this vacuum of information has come Hebrew University hydrologist Dr. Haim Gvirtzman, whose work is being studied by numerous ministers and senior government officials. Dr. Gvirtzman has done an exhaustive investigation of the geographic meaning behind the famous figures of 9 and 13 percent. These numbers have made endless headlines in Israel and abroad for several months; but without understanding the geography, the figures are meaningless.
Praise for Gvirtzman can be heard across the coalition map, from Education Minister Yitzhak Levy to Third Way Knesset Member Yehudah Harel. It was Harel who, six months ago, commissioned Gvirtzman to prepare maps detailing the implications of the pullback proposals.
"He has more material than anyone in Israel," says Harel. "The IDF has security information. Tahal [the water planning authority] has information on water, the Council of Settlements has settlement information, and the Civil Administration has information about the Palestinian population. Haim Gvirtzman has all of this together."
Among those who have asked to see Gvirtzman's work are officials in the Prime Minister's Office, the office of Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai and National Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon. Netanyahu's diplomatic advisor, Uzi Arad, has met Gvirtzman, and his material has reached the prime minister himself, Public Security Minister Avigdor Kahalani, and others.
While he says that neither the "kitchenette" nor the IDF have shown him the official maps, Gvirtzman, who has a modest office at the university's Givat Ram campus, says, "I think our maps are very similar."
Gvirtzman's words have an authentic ring. His maps reflect the same priorities announced publicly by Netanyahu and Sharon: Israel must retain the Jordan Valley, the Judean Desert, the area around Jerusalem and the western buffer between the Green Line and western Samaria, under which the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer flows.
Gvirtzman had help in analyzing the pullback proposals. The head of the World Zionist Organization settlement division, Salai Meridor, provided him with several West Bank maps, including those that detail Palestinian demography, Jewish settlers and settlements, water, roads, electricity, and telephone lines. Ofek, a company specializing in aerial photography, superimposed the maps one over the other and translated the result into digitized computer models - which helped Gvirtzman find the answers to his questions.
"What I wanted to resolve is how Israel could retain its interests in the territories - security, water, settlements and Jerusalem - while at the same time, avoid controlling the Palestinian population," says Gvirtzman. He came prepared for the task, having served as a member of Water Commissioner Gideon Tzur's panel of experts during the Oslo 2 negotiations. It was this panel that determined for Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin the amount of water Israel would be able to yield to the Palestinians.
After Netanyahu's election in May 1996, the Council of Judea and Samaria turned to Gvirtzman, who himself lives in Dolev and is religious. They persuaded him to do a study that would define Israeli interests in the territories, and suggest areas that Israel could give up, while retaining all the settlements. The Council kept the project secret, fearing that its publication would create the impression that it endorsed yielding territory. Gvirtzman's first maps were ready by September 1996. The settlers used them in talks with the government in advance of the Hebron negotiations, and they were subsequently published by Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Gvirtzman discovered that if no settlement was to be affected, Israel would have to retain about 70% of the West Bank, which is almost exactly what it has already transferred to the full or partial control of the Palestinians.
Yehudah Harel asked Gvirtzman to prepare additional maps that would reflect the impact of potential pullbacks of 7 percent, 9-10 percent, and 13 percent. "I want to make clear that no map reflects my own views," Gvirtzman says. "Rather, I just wanted to see the implications."
Israel accepts the crucial premise that any land under joint Israeli-Palestinian control (Area B) will become exclusively Palestinian (Area A) either by the end of the interim agreement or under the final status deal. Therefore, Gvirtzman created two categories: Palestinian (Areas A and B) and Israeli (Area C). In the meantime, even the isolated settlements need not be concerned, since the IDF has overall responsibility for security in Area B settlements, and the actual settlements will remain under total Israeli control (Area C). The problem begins after B becomes A, probably in a year's time: These isolated settlements will then be Israeli-controlled enclaves in a Palestinian sector, and control of the access roads will be subject to question.
"At that point," says Gvirtzman, "these settlements will not grow; rather, they will deteriorate. I believe their long-term viability is in question. I would not want to live there."
The ABC's of the peace process are as follows: At present, the Palestinians exclusively control 3 percent of the West Bank, and along with the 24 percent of Area B, they will ultimately have 27 percent. If Netanyahu chooses 9 percent, the total comes to 36 percent. If Israel meets the US standard of 13 percent, the Palestinians will reach the figure of 40 percent.
While some, including Industry and Trade Minister Natan Sharansky, have accused U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright of acting arbitrarily in selecting the 13 percent option in order to reach a round number of 40 percent ("50 percent is an even rounder number than 40 percent," he told her), it must be stressed that this is only half the argument. The United States cannot defend itself properly, since it deliberately chose not to put its own map together, so Israel could not accuse it of second-guessing Israeli security. If the U.S. had its own map, it would have favored yielding chunks of the Judean Desert, which Labor would have yielded, but where Sharon wants to build Route 80, apart from Route 90 up to the Jordan Valley.
Here are Gvirtzman's conclusions:
Impact of a 9-10 percent pullback:
Approximately 86 percent of the West Bank Palestinian population would live under the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the figure would reach 93 percent if Gaza is included. While Netanyahu likes to boast today that 98 percent of the Palestinians of the West Bank live under autonomy, this figure is very misleading. Netanyahu is referring only to civilian autonomy. In fact, the IDF has overriding control of almost all rural areas, which comprise about 97 percent of the West Bank. According to Gvirtzman's calculations, only 37 percent (588,000 out of 1,561,000) of the Palestinian population in the West Bank live under full PA control today.
Approximately 1,700 settlers living in 10 settlements would be affected, out of a total of about 155,000 in the West Bank. They are divided into two geographic areas. Between Jenin and Nablus: Kadim, Ganim, Sah Nur, Homesh, Yitzhar, and Bracha. South of Hebron: Beit Hagai, Telem, Adora, and Neguhot (not an official settlement, but a Nahal area transformed into a yeshiva.)
In the northern part of the West Bank, Israel would retain a small zone north of Jenin separating it from the Green Line. There would be Palestinian contiguity from Jenin through Nablus and down to the Trans-Samaria highway, continuing to Ramallah. Netanyahu promised contiguity in a letter to President Clinton, thereby eliminating the IDF checkposts at the edge of every Palestinian city. Israel would not retain the Northern Trans-Samaria Highway, which crosses the West Bank from east to west just south of Jenin. Instead, it would have to make do with a zone just north of Jenin - a buffer along the Green Line for Israeli-controlled travel.
According to Gvirtzman, the early warning station at Mt. Eival outside Nablus would be in a somewhat difficult situation, since IDF travel would be permitted along the road leading up to it, but the Palestinians could build alongside the road.
In terms of water, Israel would lose control of approximately 9 percent of the land that lies over the Yarkon-Taninim Aquifer, because more land would be yielded northeast of Tulkarm - apart from the estimated 6 percent already yielded in Oslo 2, which lies within the boundaries of Tulkarm and Kalkilya.
Impact of a 13 percent pullback:
In terms of the Palestinian population, 89 percent of the West Bank Palestinians would live under full PA control; 94.5 percent if Gaza is included. The main argument Harel has with Gvirtzman's map is whether one can reach 13 percent without turning Beit El and Ofra into enclaves in the final status agreement. Gvirtzman believes they are destined to be enclaves, as is Ateret in the Ramallah area.
Harel strongly disagrees: "There will be a way to connect Ofra to Israel by way of a road to the Jordan Valley, and while it is more complicated, Beit El can be linked through a road connecting to a Ramallah bypass to Jerusalem. Beit El and Ofra will remain part of Israel." According to Gvirtzman, a 13 percent pullback would affect approximately 9,000 Jewish settlers living in 18 settlements. But if Harel is correct about Beit El and Ofra, then more than half of these settlement would feel the impact. The question of Beit El and Ofra might explain MK Ehud Barak's trip to Beit El last week. The general view is that Netanyahu would do everything possible to avoid taking on the leadership of the settler movement who live in these two settlements.
Apart from the settlement enclaves listed in the 9-10 percent area, the 13 percent pullback area would also include Mevo Dotan, Shavei Shomron, and Itamar. In the Hebron area, it would include Carmei Tsur and Otniel. Israel would lose control of part, but not all, of areas north of Jenin next to the Green Line, around Wadi Ara and around Gilboa. There would be Palestinian contiguity northward, extending up to the Green Line, and virtually joining the Israeli Arab town of Umm al-Fahm. Moreover, there would be contiguity from Tulkarm to Jenin and Nablus. This would involve Palestinian control of a buffer zone along the Green Line at points just north of Tulkarm.
The Palestinians would gain control of the southwest corner of the West Bank, up to the Green Line in the Lachish region, thereby providing contiguity for isolated Palestinian villages. As for water: Above the 15 percent yielded under a 9-10 percent pullback, an extra 10 percent of the land over the Yarkon-Taninim Aquifer would be transferred. This would involve a sector north of Karnei Shomron and up to Sal'it. The Baal Hatzor early warning station northeast of Ofra would be faced with the same situation as that of Mt. Eival. [Translation courtesy of Ha'aretz English edition.]